Plato on the relationship between public and private

In these sections of The Republic, Plato often refers to an individual’s natural aptitude or abilities: “in the first place, no two of us are born exactly alike. We have different natural aptitudes, which fit us for different jobs” (370b). While this implies that Plato believed more strongly in nature than in nurture, his focus on the upbringing of his citizens, and the origin of tyranny, bring out some ambiguities on the issue.  Despite Plato’s disputable clarity on the topic, his references to a person’s nature are very connected to the question of private and public spheres and their relationship. While having a public self in any social group is inevitable, Plato seems to be arguing, it must be in direct communication with the innate, unchangeable private self and all its benefits.

Logically, Plato’s conception of what is each individual’s nature would be the most obvious informer to that person’s private sphere; it is the most basic entity of his true self.  Plato’s remark that the “greatest evil” in society is the exchange or intermixing between the classes of citizens in a society is implying that a society is most ‘just’ when citizens stay true to their nature and do not attempt to falsely, or publicly, transcend who they were ‘born to be’ in society.  Therefore, it appears that in his ideal state, Plato is attempting to create a civilization where people remain loyal to their private, inborn selves (which would exist varyingly due to everyone’s innate, varying natures) and then directly transpose these selves onto their public lives and actions with no false public constructions.

Accordingly, Plato’s analogy of the cave ends with the assertion that the philosopher rulers, who alone have been born with the capacity for attaining the divine knowledge of Forms, must, after their attainment of that knowledge, unwillingly descend back into the “cave” to rule and benefit their society with their newfound understanding.  Once again, the citizens are expected to transfer, in its full effects, any benefit from their private selves onto the public society.

Plato’s exploration of tyranny and the tyrant again seems to be remarking upon the intricate connection between our private and public selves: Plato appears to be saying that at least a significant component of tyranny in an individual is natural.  Yet sometimes it seems unclear how much he attributes to the individual’s experiences and influences, for his definition of a tyrant includes qualities that are acquired “by birth or habit or both” (573c).  Still, Plato says that a real tyrant acts how others might only dream of acting, and this is exactly what happens “when a natural tyrant gains absolute power, and the longer he holds it the truer he runs to the type” (576b).  It is unclear whether Plato’s idea of a tyrant is purely the result of outside influence, and so would be an impossibility in Plato’s ideal society, or if it is just chance of nature, and so would be a possible problem is his society.

Essentially, the relationship between Plato’s representations of citizens’ public and private spheres seems to be that one’s public sphere has an obligation to his private self to be true – for example, the class system regarding each person’s function in society set up in Plato’s ideal construction is very rigid, and would fail if someone was unfaithful to their ‘rightful place’.  The public self is that which can benefit those other then ourselves, and in a society where all personal action must be directed toward societal good, the two spheres of public and private must be in absolute accordance.